Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad range of compound phrases utilized in everyday language. This article provides a novel probabilistic framework for assessing whether the semantics of conceptual combinations are compositional, and so can be considered as a function of the semantics of the constituent concepts, or not. While the systematicity and productivity of language provide a strong argument in favor of assuming compositionality, this very assumption is still regularly questioned in both cognitive science and philosophy. Additionally, the principle of semantic compositionality is underspecified, which means that notions of both "strong" and "weak" compositionality appear in the literature. Rather than adjudicating between different grades of compositionality, the framework presented here contributes formal methods for determining a clear dividing line between compositional and non-compositional semantics. In addition, we suggest that the distinction between these is contextually sensitive. Compositionality is first formalised by factorising the joint probability distribution modeling the combination, where the terms in the factorisation correspond to individual concepts. This leads to the necessary and sufficient condition for the joint probability distribution to exist. A failure to meet this condition implies that the underlying concepts cannot be modeled in a single probability space when considering their combination, and the combination is thus deemed "non-compositional". An empirical study of twenty-four non-lexicalised conceptual combinations showed convincing evidence that some conceptual combinations behave non-compositionally according to this framework.
Introduction
Humans frequently generate novel associates when presented with unfamiliar conceptual combinations. For example, in free association experiments, subjects frequently produce the associate "slave" when cued with the compound "pet human" (Ramm, 2000) , but neither "pet" nor "human" will have the same effect when presented individually (Nelson et al., 2004) . Such cases have been used by some authors to argue that conceptual combinations have a non-compositional semantics, as it is difficult to explain how the novel free associate "slave" can be recovered from its constituent concepts (Hampton, 1997) .
Within cognitive science, the question of how to represent even single concepts is still being debated. Different positions have been put forward, including the prototype view, the exemplar view, and the theory theory view. Murphy (2002) contrasts these positions, asking which is most supported by the various aspects of cognition related to conceptual processing, e.g., learning, induction, lexical processing and conceptual understanding in children. He concludes, somewhat disappointingly, that "there is no clear, dominant winner". Moreover, there is a well documented tension in cognitive science between the compositionality and the prototypicality of concepts, which is difficult to reconcile (Frixione & Lieto, 2012; Fodor, 1998) . Arguments in favour of compositionality centre around the systematicity and productivity of language; there are infinitely many expressions in natural language and yet our cognitive resources are finite. Compositionality ensures that this infinity of expressions can be processed because an arbitrary expression can be understood in terms of its constituent parts. Since compositionality is what explains systematicity and productivity, Fodor (1998) claims that concepts are, and must be compositional, however, such claims are at odds with well-known prototypicality effects (Frixione & Lieto, 2012; Fodor, 1998) . For example, consider the conceptual combination PET FISH. A GUPPY is not a prototypical PET, nor a prototypical FISH, and yet a GUPPY is a very prototypical PET FISH (Hampton, 1997) . Therefore, the prototype of PET FISH cannot result from a simple (e.g., additive) composition of the prototypes of PET and FISH which makes the characterization of concepts in prototypical terms difficult to reconcile with compositionality (Hampton, 1997; Fodor, 1998) . This supports a view put forward by the philosopher Weiskopf (2007) when he observed that conceptual combinations are "highly recalcitrant to compositional semantic analysis", but even this observation has garnered no general support.
Here, we approach the problem of non-compositionality from a novel perspective. We shall show that a suite of sophisticated tools have already been developed for analysing non-compositionality, albeit in another field of science. These tools can be naturally extended to the analysis of concepts, and provide theoretically justified grounds for deciding whether a particular conceptual combination can be considered in terms of the semantics of its constituent parts. Specific cases will be discussed where conceptual combinations can be shown to be non-compositional using these analytical methods. We begin with a brief review of conceptual combination as it is currently understood in cognitive science.
Cognitive theories, compositionality and conceptual combination
The principle of compositionality states that the meanings of higher order expressions such as sentences are determined from a combination of the meanings of their constituent parts (Costello & Keane, 2000; Mitchell & Lapata, 2010) . This is a principle underlying many general theories of language, both natural and artificial. A compositional account of conceptual combination is closely related to the notion that concepts are atomic in nature, but this assumption of atomicity is difficult to maintain when the full variety of possible semantic behavior is considered.
Perhaps most supportive of the principle are those combinations that have an intersective semantics, e.g., the meaning of BLACK CAT is the intersection of black objects and objects that are cats. Here, it is possible to apply a conjunction operator between the two predicates referring to the constituent concepts, i.e., black(x) ∧ cat(x). Such intersective semantics are compositional, as the semantics of BLACK CAT are determined solely in terms of the semantics of the constituent concepts BLACK and CAT. It is tempting to assume that most conceptual combinations can be modeled in this way, however, the study of intersective combinations in cognitive science has revealed that not all conceptual combinations display such intersective semantics (Hampton, 1997) .
For example, the intersection of ASTRONAUT and PEN in the combination ASTRONAUT PEN is empty, and therefore its semantics are vacuous, despite being a concept that humans can easily comprehend (Gärdenfors, 2000; Weiskopf, 2007) .
A second type of conceptual combination arises when the first concept modifies the head concept, e.g., in CORPORATE LAWYER, CORPORATE modifies the more general head concept to give a sub-category of LAWYER. Schema-based theories of conceptual combination (Murphy, 1988; Wisniewski, 1996) , propose that the head concept is a schema-structure made up of various property dimensions (e.g., color, size, shape etc.) and relational dimensions (e.g., habitat, functions, behaviors etc.). Several studies have revealed that modification can produce emergent properties, e.g., in HELICOPTER BLANKET the modification of BLANKET by HELICOPTER generates associate properties such as "water proof", "camouflage", and "made of canvas", a phenomenon which present theories struggle to account for (Wilkenfeld & Ward, 2001) , and so is sometimes viewed as evidence for non-compositional semantics (Hampton, 1997; Medin & Shoben, 1988) .
Despite these tensions underlying the assumption of compositionality, virtually all researchers have at least assumed a weak form of compositionality in their analysis of human language, where for example, the initial combination process begins with separate meanings, but is supplemented later by external contextual information (Wisniewski, 1996; Swinney et al., 2007) . For example, in Wisniewski (1996) 's dual process theory of conceptual combination, a competition occurs between the processes of relation linking (e.g., ZEBRA CROSSING as a crossing for zebras), and property mapping (e.g., ZEBRA CROSSING as a striped crossing), as the meaning of the compound is decided upon. This process is affected by the similarity of the constituent concepts, because similar concepts share many facets and so are more likely to result in a property interpretation, whereas dissimilar concepts are more likely to be combined using a relational process. Thus, ELEPHANT HORSE is more likely to result in a property interpretation (e.g., a large horse), than ELEPHANT BOX, which is more likely to result in a relational interpretation (e.g., a box for holding elephants), because similar concepts share many dimensions (four legs, similar shape etc. in the case of elephant and horse) and thus are easier to combine by mapping one property to another. However, it is important to note that these processes are all weakly compositional, in the sense that they rely almost exclusively on the properties of the individual concepts. It is only later that background knowledge is drawn upon to infer the possible emergent properties of the new concept. Thus an ELEPHANT BOX could be deemed as likely to be made of a strong material such as wood, and hopefully to contain air-holes. Swinney et al. (2007) found evidence for this form of weak compositionality in conceptual combination, when they showed that for adjectival combinations such as BOILED CELERY the properties of the individual words such as "green" are activated before emergent properties such as "soft". However, for the combination APARTMENT DOG, apartment modifies the "habitat" dimension of dog rather than its "size" (a dog the size of an apartment), which in turn shows that background knowledge also plays a role in early combinatory processes such as slot selection (Murphy, 1988) .
Rather than entering the debate about the proper dividing line between weak and strong compositionality, it is our intention to provide an empirical test for the (non-)compositionality of conceptual combinations, motivated by the analysis of composite systems in quantum physics.
Thus, we feel that it is possible to shift this debate out of philosophy and into the realms of experimental psychology, 1 and this article is a step in that direction. In what follows we shall discuss the combination of concepts within a tiered model of cognition. This will provide a framework from which a (non-)compositional semantics can be developed in further sections.
2 Conceptual combination in conceptual space Gärdenfors (2000) proposed a three level model of cognition in which the representation of information varies greatly across each different level. Within the lowest level, information is pre-or sub-conceptual and is carried by a connectionist representation. At the uppermost level information is represented in terms of higher order symbolic structures such as sentences. It is at this upper symbolic level of cognition where a significant portion of the work on compositional semantics resides. Thus, a grammar specifies the parts of a sentence, and the manner in which they fit together. It makes sense that the semantics attributed to these primitive parts be intuitive, for example, a noun may be mapped to a set of entities. However, Zadrozny (1992) has suggested that it doesn't actually matter which components are chosen as primitive, a function can be found that will always produce a compositional semantics. In Zadrozny's own words, "..compositionality, as commonly defined, is not a strong [enough] constraint on a semantic theory". The consequence of this with respect to the compositional semantics of natural language, and hence conceptual combination, is that meaning need not be assigned to individual words, "we can do equally well by assigning meaning to phonemes or even LETTERS. . . " (Zadrozny, 1992) . Opponents to Zadrozny may argue that his position is overly pessimistic because it applies to "strong compositionality", a position that is clearly wrong. Nevertheless, the question remains as to where the "meanings" might come from initially.
A pragmatic approach is to define the meaning of the a concept by the set of possible senses it has. Consider the concept BAT. One reliable way to seek an understanding of this concept is via free association experiments where subjects are cued with the word "bat" and asked to produce the first word that comes to mind. Over large numbers of subjects, probabilities can be calculated that a certain associate is produced. Fig. 1 (a) depicts such a set of data taken from the University of South Florida word association norms (USF-norms) (Nelson et al., 2004 cue "bat"; a SPORT sense (with relevant associates in bold) and an ANIMAL sense. Considering the full dataset 2 allows us to generate the total probability p s of recall for the sport sense by summing the probabilities of the relevant associates: p s = 0.25 + 0.05 = 0.30. The rest of the associates all happen to be relevant to the ANIMAL sense of bat, so p a = 0.70. This suggests that the concept BAT can be modeled in a two dimensional vector space, the basis vectors of which correspond to the two possible senses, a situation that is illustrated in Fig. 1(b) . Such vector space representations are examples of how concepts can be modelled geometrically, which corresponds to the middle, or conceptual space layer of Gärdenfors (2000) three tiered model of cognition. The same can be said for the concept BOXER (see Fig. 2 (a) where, once again, the associates relevant to the sport sense of BOXER are in bold).
When applied to the conceptual combination (i.e., BOXER BAT) this reasoning suggests that four interpretations are possible. Thus when BOXER is interpreted as a sport and BAT as an animal, the corresponding interpretation of the combination maybe something along the lines of a "furry black animal with boxing gloves on", or perhaps BOXER could be interpreted as a sport and BAT as as a sport leading a subject to interpret the compound as "a fighter's implement".
The question we will now address is how compositionally can be empirically determined based on the set of possible interpretations.
3 Probabilistic approaches to characterizing compositionality
The preceding section has highlighted the fact that conceptual combinations usually have more than one possible interpretation. This may arise from a range of factors, including the meaning of the concepts themselves (e.g. BOXER can be interpreted as a dog, a sportsperson, a pair of shorts, someone who puts things in boxes, etc.), the sentence in which they appear, the background of the subject etc.. Different human subjects will often interpret the same conceptual combination differently, indeed, the same human subject, if placed in a new context may very well provide a different interpretation for the same concept. Thus, it is sensible to approach the analysis of compositionality probabilistically. In the experiments to be discussed in section 4, we will assume that the concepts being combined have at least two senses. In what follows each concept is assumed to have a dominant sense and one or more subordinate senses. The distinction between the two can be inferred from free association norms such as those discussed above. For example, the dominance of the sport sense of BOXER is clearly evident in Fig. 2(a) , where the sport sense is greater than the animal sense which leads us to designate the sport sense and dominant and the animal sense as subordinate. Another possible subordinate sense is a CLOTHING sense, namely "boxer briefs".
It should be noted, however, that the distinction between "dominant" and "subordinate" senses is not necessary for the theory presented below, rather it is an explanatory aid.
Standard probabilistic reasoning suggests that if two ambiguous concepts A and B have behavior that can be considered as compositional, then it should be possible to describe this behavior in terms of four dichotomous random variables, {A1, A2} and {B1, B2}, ranging over two values {1, 0}. The numbers 1 (dominant) and 2 (subordinate) correspond to the senses attributed to the respective concepts A and B. However, if a human subject is first shown the word "vampire" and subsequently asked to interpret the compound BOXER BAT, then they may be biased towards giving an animal interpretation of BAT. This suggests a minimal natural extension where A1 = 1 represents a situation where the dominant sense of concept A was first primed and concept A was indeed subsequently interpreted in that sense by the human subject. Conversely, A1 = 0 represents the case where the dominant sense of concept A was primed but A was not interpreted in that sense. Similarly, A2 = 1 represents a situation where a subordinate sense of concept A was first primed, and concept A was indeed subsequently interpreted in this sense, and A2 = 0
represents the case where a subordinate sense of concept A was primed, but A was not interpreted in this subordinate sense. Similar relationships hold for B1 and B2. Priming thus allows for the experimental control of the contextual cues influencing conceptual combinations. This is important because conceptual combinations always appear in a context (e.g., a discourse context), which affects how they will ultimately be interpreted. Fig. 3 gives a general representation of the Figure 3 : A potentially compositional system S, consisting of two assumed components A and B. S can perhaps be understood in terms of a mutually exclusive choice of experiments performed upon those components, one represented by the random variables A1, A2 (pertaining to an interaction between the experimenter and component A), and the other by B1, B2 (pertaining to an interaction between the experimenter and component B). Each of these experiments can return a value of 1 or 0.
reasoning used in the construction of the above probabilistic scenario. A 'black box' is depicted, with two proposed components, A and B, inside it. Two different experiments can be carried out upon each of the two presumed components, which will answer a set of 'questions' with binary outcomes, leading to four experimental scenarios. For example, one experimental scenario would be to ask whether subjects return an interpretation of the concept A that corresponds to the prime A1 and similarly for B in relation to the prime B2. What analysis can be brought to bear upon such a situation?
As with many systems, the outcomes of our experiments will have a statistical distribution over all available outcomes. In what follows, we shall aim to develop a general mathematical apparatus that can be used to discover whether the presumed sub-components can be considered as isolated, influencing one another, or in some sense irreducible. We shall do this through a consideration of the joint probability distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2) which is used to model the behavior of the experimental black box. While this analysis will be performed using conceptual combinations, we emphasize that this black box is potentially very general and that the analysis developed here can be applied to far more than the analysis of language.
We start by noting that we can construct 16 joint probabilities, corresponding to all the possible interpretations of concepts A and B that a subject might return, across the four priming conditions:
These sixteen probabilities can be set out in an array as follows:
This matrix lists the different priming conditions in a set of four blocks, which allows us to consider the structure of the probabilities describing the likely interpretation of a given conceptual combination. Observe how the matrix P AB in equation (2) is complete, in that it covers all possible priming conditions across the respective senses of the concepts.
In what follows we will show that P AB can be used to determine whether a conceptual combination is compositional, or not. We start by considering what might be required in order for a conceptual combination to be deemed compositional.
Compositional semantics
Were the semantics of the conceptual combination AB to be compositional, how would this be reflected in its probabilistic structure? Intuitively, compositionality would imply that the joint probability distribution could be recovered from the probability distributions constructed using each individual concept. This intuition can be formalized by assuming that the joint probability distribution, (2), is factorisable. For example, a naive assumption would be that the concepts in the combination can be interpreted independently of one another,
The syntax of this equation clearly reflects how the probabilistic behaviour of the conceptual combination as represented by the four joint distributions Pr(Ai, Bj) can be decomposed into a product of constituent probability distributions that correspond to the constituent concepts, namely Pr(Ai) and Pr(Bj).
Less naive formalizations of compositionality are possible. For example, the competition among relations in nominals (CARIN) theory of conceptual combination proposes sixteen possible relations that can be used to link concepts, e.g., causes, during, for and about (Gagne & Shoben, 1997; Gagne, 2001) . Therefore, the interpretation can be thought of as being conditioned by an implicit linking relation r:
where R is a random variable over the possible implicit linking relations. One form of compositionality assumption assumes that relation independently affects the interpretation of each concept:
CARIN is founded on the assumption that when people interpret a novel conceptual combination AB, the availability of each of these sixteen relations is determined by the relation frequency distribution for the modifying concept A. The random variable R is thus assumed to range over these sixteen relations. Therefore, CARIN explains why "mountain goat" is easier to interpret than "mountain magazine" because the located relation is more often used with the modifier MOUN-TAIN than the about relation. The essence of the CARIN approach to interpreting conceptual combinations can therefore be derived as follows using the compositionality assumption (5) together with the assumption that the interpretation of concept B is independent of the linking relation,
for i, j ∈ {1, 2}. The last line of the derivation shows how the the relation frequency distribution for the modifying concept A is formalized by the joint distribution Pr(Ai, R).
The goal of the preceding development of equations is not to formalize existing models, or
propose new ones, but to reveal a common aspect that is not frequently noticed; in all of the above cases the joint distribution is formed by taking the product of two simpler distributions, each obtained with reference to the constituent concepts. This reveals that an assumption of compositionality underlies the vast majority of models in this area.
Following the general approach used by Golshani & Fahmi (2001) , let us explicitly formalize this compositionality assumption, with reference to two functions f and g which are probabilistic functions centered around Ai and Bj respectively. In addition, we will use the symbol λ to denote implicit variables such as R that affect the interpretation of the conceptual combination.
Assumption 1.
If it is possible to factorise the joint probability distribution describing a compound of two presumed component concepts A and B such that:
then the joint probability distribution describing the conceptual combination AB can be factorised in terms of probability distributions based on A and B alone, and the system will be deemed compositional.
Non-compositional semantics
To analyse non-compositionality we draw upon results from the field of quantum theory. This step is not as arbitrary as it might at first seem. Indeed, equation (9) forms the basis of much of the analysis of entangled quantum systems (Aspect, 1999; Fine, 1982a; Isham, 1995; Maudlin, 1994; Laloë, 2001 ). An entangled system is one that cannot be modeled as a composition of its parts, and the field of physics has a highly developed mathematical apparatus devoted to their detection and description. The fundamental lesson learned in physics is that the joint probability of entangled quantum systems cannot be factorised into probability distributions based on A and B, and thus, they must be thought of as non-compositional. In this section we shall make use of this formalism, applying it to questions about the non-compositionality of conceptual combinations. We caution the reader that details are kept to a minimum, and encourage those interested towards the cited references and the supplementary details in the appendices.
Clauser & Horne (1974) published a versatile theorem which sets a bounded limit upon the probability distributions describing system which is assumed compositional in the general form described by equation (9) (See Appendix A):
Suppose that the compositionality assumption expressed in (9) holds, then the previous equation
can be rewritten in a much simpler form involving a set of probability distributions:
Observe how this inequality involves a set of four pairwise joint probability distributions together with two prior probabilities, which are in principle experimentally obtainable, allowing for the testing of the assumptions underlying (9). With some algebra (see Appendix A), the following inequality can be produced: This gives rise to the following expression of the CHSH inequality (Cereceda, 2000) :
where
value. (Note: In the preceding Pr(Ai) is shorthand for Pr(Ai) = 1 and Pr(Āi) is shorthand for Pr(Ai = 0), i ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly for Pr(Bj) and Pr(Bj), j ∈ {1, 2}).
The expectations can easily be computed from the matrix of probabilities (2). For example,
Recalling from (1) that p 1 = Pr(A1 = 1, B1 = 1) and p 4 = Pr(A1 = 0, B1 = 0), we recognize that p 1 corresponds to a situation where concepts A and B have both been interpreted in their dominant sense, when in both cases the dominant sense of each concept has been primed. Similarly, p 4 corresponds to both A and B being interpreted in their subordinate sense when the dominant sense of each concept has been primed. Thus, p 1 + p 4 = 1 occurs when the senses of the constituent concepts are perfectly correlated within the given priming condition. For example, assuming that the fruit sense of APPLE was primed and food sense of CHIP was primed, perfect correlation of senses in this priming condition means two conditions hold: (1) when APPLE is interpreted as a fruit CHIP is always interpreted as
food (p1) and (2) when APPLE is not interpreted as fruit, CHIP is not interpreted as food (p4).
The combination of these two conditions imply that p 1 + p 4 = 1 and p 2 + p 3 = 0. Conversely, p 2 + p 3 = 1 occurs when the senses are perfectly anti-correlated. For example, assume the fruit sense of APPLE is primed and CHIP is primed in its circuit sense. Perfect anti-correlation of senses means two conditions hold: (1) when APPLE is not interpreted as a fruit, CHIP is always interpreted as a circuit (p3) and (2) when APPLE is interpreted as fruit, CHIP is not interpreted in its circuit sense (p2).
With this as underlying intuition, the expectation value E(Ai, Bj) captures how well the senses of the constituent concepts are (anti-)correlating. The arrangement of probabilities in figure (2) is not significant. There are four possible ways to arrange the quadrants, each arrangement leading to another variant of the CHSH inequality (see Appendix A).
The quantity at the heart of the CHSH inequality E(A1, B1) + E(A1, B2) + E(A2, B1) − E(A2, B2) will be referred to as the CHSH value. Any model of conceptual combinations based on factorisation as generally expressed in equation (9) will produce a CHSH value the in the range [−2, 2] . Note the reverse does not hold, namely if the CHSH value lies in this range, it does not always imply the joint probability distribution is factorisable. It is therefore legitimate to question whether factorisability is the only way to express compositionality. An alternative is to employ addition, which is an approach commonly used to form probabilistic mixture models. For example, Mitchell & Lapata (2010) propose a composition function f of two semantic vectors u, v as follows:
Assume the vector u models a concept SPRING with senses 'season' and 'coil'. Similarly, assume that the concept PLANT ranges over the senses 'vegetation' and 'factory'. The previous equation can be used as the basis of mixture model describing the manner in which senses can be probabilistically attributed to the combined concept described by the vector f (u, v):
The coefficient α allows the component distributions forming the mixture model to be weighted.
Such a compositional model may have a CHSH value in the range [−2, 2] and not be factorisable. Therefore, although factorisability can cover a wide range of possibilities for formalising the compositionality of conceptual combinations, it is not an expressive enough means to model all forms of compositionality. As a consequence, the inability to factories the joint probability distribution is not a strong enough criterion to deem the associated conceptual combination to be non-compositional. A more reliable criterion is when the CHSH value lies outside of the range [−2, 2], meaning its absolute value is greater than 2 (|CHSH| > 2). When this condition holds, it is not possible to construct a joint probability distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2) from the four pairwise distributions Pr(A1, B1), Pr(A1, B2), Pr(A2, B1), Pr(A2, B2). This latter fact determines a clear test for non-compositionality, which does not rely on compostionality to to be modelled by factorisation.
Compositionality: Existence of the joint probability distribution
Adherence to the CHSH inequality turns out to be a necessary condition that must be satisfied if the the joint probability distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2) can be be constructed from the four pairwise joint probability distributions Pr(Ai, Bj), i, j ∈ {1, 2} (See Appendix B for the argument why this is the case). However, an even stronger result was provided by Fine (1982b) , which provides both the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the joint probability distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2):
Fine Theorem 3 (Fine, 1982b) : If A1, A2, B1, B2 are bivalent random variables with joint distributions Pr(Ai, Bj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, then necessary and sufficient for a joint distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2) is that the following system of inequalities is satisfied:
Fine's third theorem, which permits us to analyze compositionality from the perspective of the above four equations, opens up a totally new avenue for the analysis of compositionality; if the four joint probabilities making up the matrix of probabilities in equation (2) do not satisfy the system of inequalities in Fine's theorem, then the joint distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2) cannot be constructed from the four pairwise joint probability distributions Pr(Ai, Bj), i, j ∈ {1, 2}. The intuition behind this result is that non-compositionality equates with the inability to model the compound in the probability space defined by the variables A1, A2, B1 and B2. The interpretation of conceptual combinations within a priming scenario can be treated with a model of selective influence, with primes corresponding to the factors affecting random variable corresponding to the interpretation of concepts. A type of selective influence, termed marginal selectivity, assumes that primes only affect the intended concept (as was depicted in figure 3 ). For example, with respect to the conceptual combination BOXER BAT, marginal selectivity entails the interpretation of BAT does not change when the primes of BOXER are varied from "fighter" to "dog". Therefore, for marginal selectivity to hold, the following four conditions must be satisfied:
Pr(Bj) = Pr(A2, Bj) + Pr(Ā2, Bj)
Note how these equations express that the interpretation of the concept represented by the marginal probability, e.g., Pr(Ai) is stable with respect to how the other concept is primed,
represented by B1 and B2. Dzhafarov & Kujala (2012) We now illustrate how these probabilistic methods for analysing compositionality can be deployed in an experimental setting.
Empirical evaluation 4.1 Subjects
Sixty-five subjects were recruited from the undergraduate psychology pool at Griffith University and received credit for their participation. Only native English speakers were selected in order remove the possibility that the interpretation of conceptual combinations would be confounded by language issues.
Design and materials
We utilised four different priming regimes in order to generate the four different experimental scenarios suggested by Fig. 3 . In these experiments, subjects were first primed and then presented with a non-lexicalised conceptual combination, which they were asked to interpret also designating the senses that were used in that interpretation. A probabilistic analysis was then performed upon the data so obtained. Subjects were presented with twenty-four 'true' conceptual combinations (see below for an explanation), and so participated in twenty-four test trials. Table 1 lists the set of conceptual combinations used, as well as the corresponding primes.
Primes were selected from the USF free association norms (Nelson et al., 2004) and the University of Alberta norms of homographs (Twilley et al., 1994) . The majority of primes were selected from the USF norms. The procedure for selecting primes from these norms was to view a potential prime as a cue which produces the concept as an associate. As an example, "money" was chosen from the USF norms to prime the financial sense of BANK as "bank" is produced as a free associate of the cue 'money'. Similarly, "river" was chosen to prime the natural sense of BANK. Occasionally when a particular sense was not present in the USF norms, we drew upon the University of Alberta norms. Importantly, the USF norms were used to avoid cues such as 'account which was associated with both BANK and LOG, thereby minimising the possibility of priming more than one concept at a time.
A single factor design was used, which analysed responses to non-lexicalised conceptual combinations under priming conditions that varied between subjects. A subject was assigned to one of four priming conditions for each presented conceptual combination. For example, the four priming conditions for BANK LOG are (1) "money" and "journal" (A1 − B1), (2) "money" and "tree" (A1 − B2), (3) "river" and "journal" (A2 − B1), or (4) "river" and "tree" (A2 − B2). This assignment of primes was based upon a between groups Latin square design, such that for the 24 combinations, each participant completed each priming condition 6 times. Combinations were chosen with the expectation that the ambiguity of its constituents would allow a number of alternative interpretations, where each interpretation arose from a different attribution of meaning to the underlying sense of the ambiguous concepts (Costello & Keane, 1997) .
Procedure
Participants completed 3 practice trials, 24 test trials and 24 filler trials, and Fig. 4 shows a schematic illustration of the procedure followed during a test trial. All trials were composed of six phases, consisting of three initial time-pressured tasks followed by three non-timed tasks. The time limitation of the first three phases was utilised in order to maximise the effectiveness of the priming. The experiment took around 20-30 minutes to complete, and participants pushed the ENTER key to begin each trial.
Phases 1-2:
Two consecutive double lexical decision tasks were carried out, where participants were asked to decide as quickly as possible whether two letter strings, a prime and the concept to be presented as a part of the compound given in Phase 3, were legitimate words, or if one of the strings was a non-word. Each lexical decision consisted of the the two letter strings presented in the center of screen, one below the other, in order to discourage participants from interpreting the two words as a phrase. Participants responded to the decision tasks by pushing a button on the keyboard, labeled 'word' or a button labeled 'non-word' (left arrow and right arrow keys respectively). For instance, if given the strings "coil" and "spring", then participants were expected to decide that both strings were words and so push the 'word' key, whereas if given "grod" and "church" then participants were expected to decide that they had been shown a non-word and to push the 'nonword' key. For all of the test trials participants received two phases of word-word strings. The response ratio for the two priming phases were: 50% word → word (test trial), 25% non-word → non-word (filler trial), 12.5% word → non-word (filler trial), 12.5% non-word → word (filler trial). In phases where a non-word was present, it appeared equally often in the top or the bottom portion of the screen.
The double-lexical decision task was used to associate the priming word and test word together without participants interpreting them as a compound (Gagne, 2001 ). This procedure isolates the experimental priming to each concept in the combination. For example, the lexical decision task applied to "coil" and "spring" was designed to prime the coil sense of the concept SPRING in the conceptual combination SPRING PLANT. The order of the two double lexical decision tasks was counter-balanced, so that half were presented in the same order as the compound words (e.g.,
"coil" and "spring" were first presented, then "factory" and "plant") and half were presented in the reverse order (e.g., first "factory" and "plant" were presented for lexical decision, followed by "coil" and "spring".
Phase 3:
A conceptual combination was presented in the center of the screen (e.g., "spring plant"). Participants were asked to push the space bar as soon as they thought of an interpretation for the compound. Filler compounds were included for the filler (i.e., non-word) trials so as not to disrupt the participant's rhythm in making two lexical decisions followed by an interpretation.
Phase 4:
Participants were asked to type in a description of their interpretation.
Phases 5-6:
Two disambiguation tasks were carried out, where participants chose what sense they gave to each word from a list (e.g., plant = A. 'a living thing'; B. 'a factory'; C. 'other').
Results
Experimental subcomponents utilizing non-words were discarded during the analysis presented here, and the results obtained are presented in Table 1 .
In total, 91.5% of the interpretations provided by the subjects fell within one of the four primed senses of the studied conceptual combinations. Confidence intervals around the CHSH value were computed using the bootstrap method. The bootstrap method is designed to estimate an unknown parameter, in this case the CHSH value, and provide confidence intervals for this estimate. The method assumes that the observed data is independent and identically distributed.
Independence in this experiment means that each subject's interpretation of a given conceptual combination is independent of interpretations of other subjects for that combination, and so is a reasonable assumption. The actual observed data consists of interpretations which populate each of the 16 cells in P AB (see equation (2)). A bootstrap sample is a random sample drawn with replacement from the actual sample. Two thousand samples were bootstrapped from the observed data for each conceptual combination. The CHSH value was computed for each bootstrap sample to produce a distribution of values across the two thousand samples. Percentile confidence limits were applied (Efron & Tibshirani, 1986) . IfĈHSH L,α denotes the estimate of the CHSH value from the bootstrap distribution such that only a fraction α/2 of all bootstrap estimates are less than this value, and likewiseĈHSH H,α is the estimate exceeded by only α/2 of all bootstrap estimates, then the confidence interval is given by (ĈHSH L,α ,ĈHSH H,α ). A 95% confidence level was applied meaning α = 0.05.
In order to apply Fine's theorem, marginal selectivity must first be tested. Appendix C depicts an analysis of marginal selectivity. This analysis reveals that the combination STOCK TICK fails marginal selectivity (α = 0.05) and can immediately be declared non-compositional as a joint distribution cannot be constructed when marginal selectivity fails (Dzhafarov & Kujala, 2012) .
For compounds other than STOCK TICK, the bootstrap method was applied. The percentage of the two thousand bootstrap samples that violated the theorem was computed. This value is used to denote the confidence that the theorem was violated for the observed data.
Discussion
A violation of the CHSH inequality or Fine's theorem by a given conceptual combination gives us good reason to believe that it is non-compositional. In addition, it is possible to provide further details about how the joint probability distribution is structured when a violation occurs which serves to illustrate a number of key features about non-compositionality. In what follows, we shall utilize two examples: BOXER BAT and APPLE CHIP.
BOXER BAT
Equation (23) (23) we can see that the probability mass does not center sufficiently around the diagonals in such a way that it can produce the correlations between the senses necessary to violate the CHSH inequality. As |CHSH ≤ 2| is not a sufficient condition for the joint probability distribution to exist, Fine's theorem must be used. As this theorem is not violated, BOXER BAT is therefore deemed to be compositional as a joint probability distribution can be constructed which models how it is interpreted within the given priming conditions. boxer 
APPLE CHIP
In contrast, APPLE CHIP leads to a joint distribution that has a more interesting structure: 
In this case, we see a strong pattern of correlation between the senses across the four priming conditions because the probabilities are concentrated on the diagonals or reverse diagonals. Thus, whenever a subject interprets APPLE as a fruit they tend to interpret CHIP in its FOOD sense.
Conversely, if APPLE is interpreted as a 'computer' then a CHIP is interpreted as an 'electronic device'. A second key factor is that a non-zero value has been returned by the ensemble of subjects for one off-diagonal case p 2 = Pr(A1 = 1, B1 = 0) = 0.06 (see equation (2)) Even though the food sense of CHIP has been primed, atypical interpretations of the compound are produced, for example, "apples growth is controlled by an internal chip". Costello & Keane (2000) identify three categories of non-compositionality in novel conceptual combinations, and atypical instances are at the basis of one of these categories. Some other non-compositional combinations similarly showed atypical interpretations. For example, BANK LOG also exhibits a strong correlation between the senses: When BANK is interpreted as a financial institution, LOG tends to be interpreted as a record. Conversely, when BANK is interpreted in it's RIVER sense, LOG is interpreted as a PIECE OF WOOD. However, there were atypical cases where the senses cross over which produces an off-diagonal probability e.g., "a record of a bank of a river".
The CHSH value for APPLE CHIP is greater than 2, which means that the joint probability distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2) cannot be constructed from the four pairwise joint probability distributions and is therefore non-compositional.
Agreement between CHSH and Fine's theorem
Ideally, the compositionality analysis using the CHSH inequality and Fine's theorem should be in agreement. For example, if the CHSH inequality is violated (|CHSH > 2|), then the system of inequalities (15)- (18) (15)- (18) can still be violated. This is because adherence to the CHSH inequality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the joint distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2) to exist. There are compounds where |CHSH ≤ 2| and Fine's theorem is violated, namely WEB BUG and CRANE HATCH. Such compounds are deemed "non-compositional" as Fine's theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the joint probability distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2) to exist. Fine's theorem is therefore a stronger result than the CHSH inequality. However, even though Fine's theorem is stronger result, it does involve the additional test for marginal selectivity before it can be employed. The CHSH inequality does involve the marginal probabilities Pr(A1), Pr(A2), Pr(B1), Pr(B2) so marginal selectivity doesn't need to be tested when applying the CHSH inequality. Therefore, we advocate that the following procedure could be followed to analyse the potential compositionality of a given conceptual combination:
1. If the CHSH inequality is violated (|CHSH > 2|), then the conceptual combination is "noncompositional".
2. If CHSH inequality is not violated (|CHSH ≤ 2|), then employ the following three step procedure:
(a) First test marginal selectivity.
(b) If marginal selectivity fails, then the conceptual combination is "non-compositional".
(c) If marginal selectivity holds, then Fine's theorem can be applied. If any of the inequalities in Fine's theorem are violated, the conceptual combination is "non-compositional", otherwise it is "compositional".
This procedure is the major contribution of this paper. It provides a clear set of tests that can be used to move the debate about compositionality into the realm of empirical testability. We shall now conclude this section with some further analysis of our results emphasising this is not essential to the above key contribution.
Analysis of priming
The priming data was analysed according to whether participants interpretations matched or did not match the priming words. Interpretations were sorted into two conditions:
1. Consistent: The sense chosen for both words of the compound matched the senses of both of the priming words.
2. Inconsistent: The sense chosen for both words of the compound did not match the senses of the priming words.
As an example, if participants were given the primes "money" and "journal" followed by the compound BANK LOG, then the interpretation "a record in a financial institution" was consistent with both primes, whereas "a log on a river bank" was inconsistent with both primes. The effect of priming was analysed by investigating the number of interpretations and speed of response of each participant depending upon the priming condition. We also analysed the effect of prime order. Mean response time for interpreting a compound was 3533.26 ms, with a standard deviation of 3836.41 ms. Responses greater than 2 standard deviations were removed from the data.
The two dependent variables were the frequency of interpretations and the speed with which an interpretation was produced (response time).
Frequency of Interpretations
The frequency of interpretations was analysed using Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. As expected, overall participants gave significantly more interpretations that were consistent with the primes (mean = 6.88), than inconsistent with the primes (mean = 4.72), z = 4.06, p < .0001. This provides evidence that the primes were affecting the interpretations given in the correct direction. To analyse whether the order in which the primes were shown had an effect on number of interpretations, we divided the consistent and inconsistent interpretations into whether the priming words were in the same order or reverse order to that of the compound. differences were found. Furthermore, the priming effect was still present within the priming order conditions. That is, when prime order was the same, participants gave significantly more consistent interpretations (mean = 3.20) than inconsistent interpretations (mean = 2.32), z = 2.77, p = .006.
Likewise, when prime order was reversed, participants again gave significantly more consistent interpretations (mean = 3.67) than inconsistent interpretations (mean = 2.40), z = 3.34, p = .001. Overall, these results provide strong evidence that the priming was effective, and that it is independent of priming order.
Response time
The speed of producing an interpretation was analysed according to whether it was consistent or inconsistent with regards to the priming words, and whether this was affected by prime order. It was expected that if the priming was effective then interpretations that were inconsistent with the primes would be produced slower than interpretations that were consistent with the primes.
As seen in table 6, the mean response times were in the correct direction. Since a number of participants did not give responses for all of the categories, the number of participants in the analysis was 51. The analysis showed no main effect of Interpretation (p = 0.297), Prime Order (p = 0.718), nor an Interpretation x Prime Order interaction (p = 0.994). One likely reason for the non-significant effects is the large variance in response times (range = 369ms to 10035 ms), thus making it difficult for the mean differences to reach significance. For this reason we feel that the frequency scores are more reliable measures, and importantly these showed significant effects of priming.
Compound familiarity
One concern is that the evidence for non-compositionality found in this study may be a function of familiarity. In particular, highly familiar compounds would be expected to require less combinatorial processing as the combined meaning may simply be retrieved from long term memory.
We consider this possibility unlikely due to the experimental procedure followed. The fact that both words are ambiguous allows the priming procedure to shift participants into considering new combined meanings. For instance, while most participants (86%) interpreted SPRING PLANT as "a plant that grows in spring", when primed with 'coil' and 'leaf', 3% of participants gave the interpretation "a springy plant". Thus these participants have arguably been influenced by priming towards generating a new meaning, even though a highly common meaning already exists. In fact, as previously mentioned for spring plant and other compounds the findings of non-compositionality seem to depend upon participants producing novel meanings for the compounds. This finding goes against the hypothesis that non-compositionality is driven entirely by the retrieval of pre-stored meanings. To test whether familiarity is associated with non-compositionality, we obtained hit rates for each compound by typing each into google with quotes. This measure of familiarity has been used in previous studies (e.g., (Ramm & Halford, 2012; Wisniewski & Murphy, 2005) . It was found that the novelty of compounds based upon hit rates ranged from 144 (STAG YARN) to 9,460,000 (BATTERY CHARGE). To reduce the large variance obtained in the hit rates we transformed the scores into logs of ten. If familiarity is driving the non-compositionality results it would be expected that CHSH scores would be positively correlated with google hit rates. To test this we calculated a Pearson R correlation. This showed a weak positive correlation between the two variables, though this was non-significant, r = 0.21, p = .337. Thus we did not find evidence for the hypothesis that the non-compositionality of compounds in this study is driven by familiarity. However, as there were only 24 compounds under study, we acknowledge that there may not have been enough power to derive a significant correlation.
More generally, the primes are an experimentally pragmatic means to manipulate the manner in which context affects the interpretation applied to conceptual combinations, and so they need only influence the interpretation, not determine it. The violations that do occur arise only with respect to the reported priming conditions, and may not occur in a different experimental context. 5 Broader reflections on compositionality and non-compositionality Costello & Keane (2000) classify non-compositional conceptual combinations into three categories depending upon how their apparent non-compositionality arises. Firstly, some combinations are deemed non-compositional because of emergent properties, which generally arise from a meaning which is based on a subset of atypical instances. The aforemetioned PET FISH example is placed in this category. A second set of conceptual combinations are classified non-compositional due to the manner in which the senses of the combining words are extended beyond their standard usage, to refer to instances outside the categories usually named by those words. Finally, some conceptual combinations are classified as non-compositional because they make use of cognitive processes such as metaphor, analogy or metonymy in their interpretation. Costello & Keane (2000) use the conceptual combination SHOVEL BIRD to illustrate all three categories: 1. A "shovel bird" could be a bird with a flat beak for digging up food 2. A "shovel bird" could be a bird that comes to eat worms when you dig in the garden 3. A "shovel bird" could be a plane that scoops up water from lakes to dump on fires 4. A "shovel bird" could be a company logo stamped on the handle of a shovel 5. A "shovel bird" could be someone allowed out of jail (free as a bird) as long as he works on a road crew They argue that (1) and (2) are examples of the first category because a bird with a flat beak is atypical, whereas (3) illustrates the second category because it extends the sense of both SHOVEL and BIRD beyond their normal usage. Finally (4) and (5) are put forward as examples of third category due to their metaphoric nature. Costello & Keane (2000) detail how their constraint-based theory of conceptual combination specifically relates to each of these categories. The framework presented in this paper, however, models the non-compositionality of SHOVEL BIRD irrespective of the category of non-compositionality involved. For example, SHOVEL has the sense of being a tool, or being shaped like a shovel. The concept BIRD has three senses in the preceding example:
relating to an animal, a plane, and a prisoner. Thus, the concept BIRD could be modeled as consisting of both a dominant ANIMAL (A1) and a subordinate PLANE (A2) sense, and then Fine's theorem or the CHSH inequality applied to test for the non-compositionality of each combination resulting from a combination of BIRD with SHOVEL.
In addition, there is no requirement in the presented analytical framework that the concepts be homographs. We require only that there be ambiguity caused by multiple possible interpretations of a concept, and this readily presents. A WordNet analysis of the noun-noun combinations used in the compositional models explored by Mitchell & Lapata (2010) reveals that the vast majority have more than one synset and hence more than one shade of meaning, and these may even be related (as was the case for the polysemous concept SHOVEL). Ambiguity could also derive from relations. For example, the CARIN model assumes that relations apply to the modifier, so in ADOLESCENT DOCTOR (taken from Gagne (2001)), an ambiguity arises between the competing relations in "doctor FOR adolescents" and "doctor IS adolescent". Both of these possibilities for the concept ADOLESCENT could be accessed through priming, and then probabilistically represented with their corresponding variables A1 or A2 (Gagne (2001) provides an experimental procedure for priming relations). DOCTOR is also ambiguous because it is polysemous, e.g. a medical doctor, or someone holding a PhD. Both of these possibilities could be modeled by the variables B1 and B2. This example shows that the analytical framework presented here could be applied to the study of (non-)compositionality in conceptual combinations which have already been considered in the literature.
As the framework is general, and can be empirically tested, we argue that it has wide applicability for the analysis of conceptual combinations. However, the determination of compositionality that this analysis provides must take into account the priming conditions of the test, which empirically simulate the context (e.g., the discourse context) of the interpretation; there is no result without a supplied context (in this case the priming). This is also the case in quantum physics; a system may be deemed compositional in one measurement context, and not in another. It is a test for (non-)compositionality that this article contributes, not an adjudication of the debate on compositionality in conceptual representation.
This article has shown that compositionality can be expressed by a factorisable joint probability distribution. If the factorisabilty assumption is empirically borne out then the CHSH inequality will not be violated. Violation of the CHSH inequality, however, has an important modelling implication that goes beyond modelling by means of a factorisable joint probability distribution.
A parsimonious approach to modelling a conceptual combinations entails that a single model can describe how it is being interpreted, namely a global joint probability distribution can be constructed from the four empirically collected pairwise joint distributions. Adherence to the CHSH inequality is necessary for the global distribution to be constructed. The implications of Fine's theorem are stronger. It specifies the necessary and sufficient conditions for the global distribution to be constructed from the pairwise joint distributions. In other words, a violation of Fine's theorem equates the inability to treat the four variables A1, A2, B1 and B2 modelling the conceptual combination as random variables all defined on one probability space. Acacio De Barros (2012) labels this fact "contextuality" because the inability to construct the joint distribution over the four variables is equivalent to the inability to assign values to the four variables that is consistent with all the experimentally observed marginal distributions. This notion of contextuality provides some insight into non-compositionality as presented in this article. Intuitively, if the way the conceptual combination is being interpreted varies sufficiently across the different priming conditions it will not be possible to provide a global model of the interpretations which is consistent with how the the interpretations are behaving with respect to the marginal distributions. We contend that in such cases the combination is non-compositional and moreover provides an empirically testable dividing line between compositionality and non-compositionality. This view also holds that non-compositionality is a context-sensitive notion.
It appears that historically George Boole considered the problem of the constraints involved when trying to construct a global distribution of three variables from pairwise joint distributions (Pitowsky, 1994) , however, it is the Russian mathematician Vorob'ev who discovered results equivalent to that of Fine's theorem. As he was a contemporary of Kolmogorov, who axiomatized probability theory, Vorob'ev was apparently ignored (Khrennikov, 2010) . Thus, it was quantum physics that became famous for demonstrating the impossibility of modeling entangled systems in a single probability space. In our opinion, this is but a quirk of the past, and Dzhafarov & Kujala (2012) have independently shown how such results appear in cognitive psychology. The history just sketched, together with the fact that both the CHSH and Fine's theorem are based solely on conventional probability theory, opens the possibility to non-controversially apply them outside of quantum physics (Aerts et al., 2000; Bruza et al., 2011; Khrennikov, 2010; Aerts & Sozzo, 2011) .
The resultant approach to modeling does not rest on the assumption that the cognitive system in question can be modeled in a single probability space, and so considerably widens the possibilities of analysis. It is likely that many systems traditionally deemed analytically intractable could be fruitfully modeled with such an extension.
Conclusions
This article departed from the assumption that conceptual combinations may not exclusively exhibit compositional semantics. The very idea of a non-compositional semantics has been resisted in the literature spanning cognitive science, philosophy and linguistics, probably because the "principle of compositionality" has had such a significant track record of success over a long period.
It is, however, precisely the assumption that semantics must necessarily be of a compositional form that has been regularly questioned in a wide range of literature. Despite this state of confusion, few analytical approaches have been proposed that are capable of demarcating the difference between the two forms of behavior. We have shown that it is possible to analyze the manner in which the semantics of a given conceptual combination might be considered as compositional, or noncompositional. Indeed, it is perhaps timely to remind the reader that we do not argue against compositional semantics per se. Rather, we have tried in this article to shed light on the line at which it breaks down: We believe that both compositional and non-compositional analyses will be necessary in order to provide a full account of the semantics of language.
The semantics of concepts were modeled in terms of the different senses in which a concept may be understood, where a given sense corresponds to the interpretation attributed to a particular ambiguous concept. These senses have a reliable intersubjective cognitive underpinning, as they were grounded in terms of human word association norm data, which was used to predict the probability that a subject would attribute a particular sense to an ambiguous concept. Utilising formal frameworks developed for analysing composite systems in quantum theory, we presented two methods that allow the semantics of conceptual combinations to be classified as "compositional" or "non-compositional". This classification differs from previous research in two ways.
Firstly, compositionality is not graded, e.g., "weak" vs. "strong" compositionality. Secondly, the declaration of compositionality, or non-compositionality, is not an absolute classification, but context sensitive. An empirical study of twenty-four novel conceptual combinations showed convincing evidence for non-compositional semantics in some combinations. An important corollary is that those conceptual combinations violating Fine's theorem and the CHSH inequality cannot be modeled in a single probability space. This result could have a marked impact in modeling cognitive phenomena more generally, as these phenomena are frequently assumed to be compositional, and are almost always modeled within a single probability space.
Finally, this article shows quantum theory is a fruitful source of new theoretical insights and tools for modeling conceptual semantics as it has already provided for other areas of cognition (Bruza et al., 2009; Aerts, 2009; Khrennikov, 2010; Busemeyer et al., 2011; Busemeyer & Bruza, 2012 ).
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Wisniewski, E. J., & Murphy, G. (2005) A The Clauser Horne "A2 inequality"
In the appendix of (Clauser & Horne, 1974) , the following inequality is proven (referred to as "inequality A2" in the paper). This general inequality can be used to generate inequalities that have been used in quantum physics. 
In the following Ai is shorthand for Ai = 1 andĀi is shorthand for Ai = 0, i ∈ {1, 2}. Similarly for Bj andBj, j ∈ {1, 2}. Let λ denote implicit random variables which are assumed to affect the interpretation of a conceptual combination modelled by the random variables A1, A2, B1, B2.
Let x 1 = f (A1, λ), x 2 = f (A2, λ), y 1 = g(B1, λ), y 2 = g(B2, λ), X = Y = 1. Using inequality A2 (25):
−1 ≤ f (A1, λ)g(B1, λ) − f (A1, λ)g(B2, λ) + f (A2, λ)g(B1, λ) + f (A2, λ)g(B2, λ) − f (A2, λ) − g(B1, λ) ≤ 0
When compositionality is assumed (equation (9)), the previous can be rewritten as:
−1 ≤ Pr(A1, B1|λ) − Pr(A1, B2|λ) + Pr(A2, B1|λ) + Pr(A2, B2λ) − Pr(A2|λ) − Pr(B1|λ) ≤ 0
The CH-A2 inequality allows other systems of inequalities to be derived depending on how the 2000):
− 2 ≤ E(A2, B1) − E(A2, B2) + E(A1, B1) + E(A1, B2) ≤ 2
Similarly, the final two CHSH inequalities can be derived:
− 2 ≤ E(A1, B2) − E(A1, B1) + E(A2, B2) + E(A2, B1) ≤ 2 (38) −2 ≤ E(A2, B2) − E(A2, B1) + E(A1, B2) + E(A1, B1) ≤ 2 (39)
B The CHSH inequality and existence of the joint probability distribution
Let A1,A2, B1, B2 be random variables ranging over {+1, −1}. The CHSH inequality has the form:
−2 ≤ E(A2, B1) − E(A2, B2) + E(A1, B1) + E(A1, B2) ≤ 2
The heart of the inequality can be seen as a contrast of expectations: CHSH = (E(A1, B1) + E(A1, B2)) + (E(A2, B1) − E(A2, B2))
Each row of Table 2 depicts a model of all possible interpretations across the senses which is the basis of the joint distribution Pr(A1, A2, B1, B2). The table also shows value X = (A1B1 + A1B2) + (A2B1 − A2B2), which computes the product of outcomes. The table shows that for the joint probability distribution to exist the CHSH value must lie between -2 and 2. 
C Marginal selectivity

